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Quantum dice rolling
N. Aharon and J. Silman
School of Physics and Astronomy, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv 69978, Israel
A coin is just a two sided dice. Recently, Mochon proved that quantum weak
coin flipping with an arbitrarily small bias is possible. However, the use of quantum
resources to allow N remote distrustful parties to roll an N-sided dice has yet to be
addressed. In this paper we show that contrary to the classical case, N-sided dice
rolling with arbitrarily small bias is possible for any N . In addition, we present a six-
round three-sided dice rolling protocol, achieving a bias of 0.181, which incorporates
weak imbalanced coin flipping.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coin flipping is a cryptographic problem in which a pair of remote distrustful parties, usually referred to as Alice
and Bob, must generate a random bit that they agree on. There are two types of coin flipping protocols. In weak coin
flipping (WCF) one of the parties prefers one of the outcomes and the other prefers the opposite, whereas in strong
coin flipping (SCF) each party does not know the other’s preference. The security of a WCF protocol is quantified by
the biases ǫA and ǫB; if P
∗
A and P
∗
B are the maximal winning probabilities achievable by a dishonest Alice and Bob,
then
ǫi=ˆP
∗
i −
1
2
, i = A, B . (1)
The biases tell us to what extent each of the parties can increase their chances of winning beyond one half.
ǫ=ˆmax (ǫA, ǫB) is often referred to as the bias of the protocol. Correspondingly, in SCF there are four biases.
The problem of coin flipping was first introduced by Blum in 1981, who analyzed it in classical settings [1]. It
was subsequently shown that if there are no limitations on the parties’ computational power a dishonest party can
always force any outcome they desire [2]. With the publication of the quantum key distribution protocol of Bennett
and Brassard in 1984[3], it was realized that many communication tasks that are impossible in a classical setting
may be possible in a quantum setting. In 1999 Goldenberg et al. introduced a quantum gambling protocol [4],
which is a problem closely related to WCF (see [5]). The first quantum (strong) coin flipping protocol per se was
presented by Aharonov et al. in 2000 [6]. The protocol achieves a bias of
√
2/4 ≃ 0.354 [7]. Soon afterward Spekkens
and Rudolph [8], and independently Ambainis [9], devised a SCF protocol with a bias of 1/4. On the other hand,
Kitaev subsequently proved that there is a limit to the efficacy of SCF protocols [10]: Any SCF protocol must satisfy
P
(i)
A
∗ · P (i)B
∗ ≥ 1/2, i ∈ {0, 1}, where P (i)A
∗
(P
(i)
B
∗
) is dishonest Alice’s (Bob’s) maximal probability of forcing the
outcome i. As regards WCF, in 2002 Spekkens and Rudolph introduced a family of three rounds of communication
protocols in which both dishonest parties have a bias of (
√
2 − 1)/2 ≃ 0.207 [11]. Mochon then improved upon
Spekkens and Rudolph’s result by constructing WCF protocols with an infinite number of rounds [12, 13]. These
efforts culminated in a proof that WCF with an arbitrarily small bias is possible [14]. Most recently, building upon
Mochon’s latest result, Chailloux and Kerenidis devised a SCF protocol, which saturates Kitaev’s bound in the limit
of an infinite number of rounds [15].
The paper is constructed as follows. In section II we define the problem of dice rolling and prove that, using
quantum resources, dice rolling with an arbitrarily small bias is possible. This result stands in marked contrast to the
classical case, where, under certain conditions, an honest party always loses. In section III we analyze a three-round
weak imbalanced coin flipping protocol, which generalizes the results of Spekkens and Rudolph to the imbalanced case.
The protocol is then used in section IV to implement a six-round three-sided dice rolling protocol; the motivation
being to provide an indication of the degree of security achievable by a protocol with a minimal number of rounds of
communication. We conclude with a short discussion.
II. QUANTUM DICE ROLLING WITH ARBITRARILY SMALL BIAS
It is straightforward to generalize the problem of coin flipping to multi-party settings. In multi-party coin
flipping N remote distrustful parties must decide on a bit. An analysis of multi-party SCF in a quantum setting
2was carried out in [16], and similarly to the two-party case, it was shown that the use of quantum resources is
advantageous. Another possible generalization is the problem of N remote distrustful parties having to agree on
a number from 1 to N , with party i preferring the i-th outcome. To the best of our knowledge this problem has
never been considered in classical settings. We shall term this problem “dice rolling”. For N = 2 the problem
reduces to WCF, while for N > 2, there are now many different cheating scenarios, as any number of parties
n < N may be dishonest. We will be interested in the N “worst case” scenarios where all but one of the parties
are dishonest and, moreover, are cooperating with one another. That is, the dishonest parties share classical and
quantum communication channels. In addition, we will require that the protocol be “fair” in the sense that the
honest party’s maximum losing probability be the same in each of these N scenarios. Of course, the security
of the protocol can be evaluated with respect to any other cheating scenario, but as we will consider only fair
protocols, the security of any cheating scenarios is never poorer than that provided by the aforementionedN scenarios.
We begin by observing that in coin flipping protocols the bias has a complementary definition. We could just as
well define it as
ǫ¯i=ˆP¯
∗
i − 1/2 , i = A, B (2)
where P¯ ∗i = P
∗
j 6=i is the maximum probability that party i loses. According to this definition the bias tells us to what
extent party j 6= i can increase the other party i’s chances of losing beyond one half. In the case of N parties, the bias
ǫ¯i then tells us to what extent the N − 1 dishonest parties can increase party i’s chances of losing beyond 1 − 1/N ,
rather than to what extent a sole dishonest party can increase its chances of winning beyond 1/N . We shall always
use this redefinition of the bias when considering dice rolling. The computation of biases in dice rolling is therefore
equivalent to the computation of biases in a weak imbalanced coin flipping protocol.
We shall now prove that that quantum weak N -sided dice rolling with arbitrarily small bias is possible for any N .
The proof is by construction. Consider the following N -party protocol. Each party is uniquely identified according to
a number from 1 to N . The protocol consists of N − 1 stages. In stage one parties 1 and 2 “weakly flip” a balanced
quantum coin. The winner and party 3 then weakly flip an imbalanced quantum coin in stage two, where if both
parties are honest 3’s winning probability equals 1/3. And so on, the rule being that in stage n ≥ 2 the winner of
stage n − 1 and party n “weakly flip” an imbalanced quantum coin, where if both parties are honest, n’s winning
probability equals 1/ (n+ 1). Thus, if all parties are honest each has the same overall winning probability of 1/N .
Using Mochon’s formalism [14], Chailloux and Kerenidis have recently proved that weak imbalanced coin flipping
with arbitrarily small bias is possible [15]. It follows that in the limit where each of the weak imbalanced coin flipping
protocols, used to implement our dice rolling protocol, admits a vanishing bias (and N is finite), any honest party’s
winning probability tends to 1/N ; for a formal proof see the appendix. Moreover, since we have considered the worst
case cheating scenario, this result holds for any other cheating scenario.
The above result is in stark contrast to the classical case where if the number of honest parties is not strictly
greater than N/2, then the dishonest parties can force any outcome they desire. To see why this is so, let us consider
a classical N -sided dice rolling protocol and partition the parties into two groups of m ≤ ⌈N/2⌉ and n = N − m
parties. If both groups are honest, the probability that a party in the first (second) group wins is m/N (1 −m/N).
Therefore, any dice rolling protocol can serve as a weak imbalanced coin flipping protocol. Suppose now that all of
the parties in the second group are dishonest, and are nevertheless unable to force with certainty the outcome they
choose. Clearly, this would still be the case even if they were the smaller group, i.e. n < m (m > ⌈N/2⌉), and we
get a contradiction, since in classical weak imbalanced coin flipping (as in weak balanced coin flipping) at least one
of the parties should always be able to force whichever outcome they desire [17].
III. A THREE-ROUND WEAK IMBALANCED COIN FLIPPING PROTOCOL
In this section we analyze a three-round weak imbalanced coin flipping protocol based on quantum gambling. It is
constructed such that if both parties are honest Alice’s winning probability equals 1 − p. Interestingly, it turns out
that this protocol coincides with the generalization of Spekkens and Rudolph’s work to the imbalanced case. The
protocol will be used in the subsequent section to implement a six-round three-sided dice rolling protocol.
The protocol
1. Alice prepares a superposition of two qubits
|ψ0〉 =
√
1− p− η |↑1↓2〉+
√
p+ η |↓1↑2〉 , 0 ≤ η ≤ 1− p , (3)
3where the subscripts serve to distinguish between the first and second qubit and will be omitted when the
distinction is clear. She then sends the second qubit to Bob.
2. Bob carries out a unitary transformation Uη on the qubit he received and another qubit (labelled by the subscript
3) prepared in the state |↓〉 such that
|↑2↓3〉 → Uη |↑2↓3〉 =
√
p
p+ η
|↑2↓3〉+
√
η
p+ η
|↓2↑3〉 , (4)
and
|↓2↑3〉 → Uη |↓2↑3〉 =
√
η
p+ η
|↑2↓3〉 −
√
p
p+ η
|↓2↑3〉 , (5)
with Uη acting trivially on all other states. The resulting state is then
|ψ1〉 = Uη |ψ0〉 =
√
1− p− η |↑1↓2↓3〉+√p |↓1↑2↓3〉+√η |↓1↓2↑3〉 . (6)
Following this, he checks whether the second and third qubits are in the state |↑2↓3〉.
3. Bob wins if he finds the qubits in the state |↑2↓3〉. Alice then checks whether the first qubit is in the state |↓〉,
in which case Bob passes the test. If Bob does not find the qubits in the state |↑2↓3〉, he asks Alice for the first
qubit and checks whether all three qubits are in the state
|ξ〉 =ˆ
√
1− p− η
1− p |↑1↓2↓3〉+
√
η
1− p |↓1↓2↑3〉 , (7)
in which case she passes the test.
Alice’s maximal bias
Most generally Alice can prepare any state of the form
|ψ′0〉 =
∑
i, j=↑, ↓
αij |ij〉 ⊗ |Φij〉 , (8)
where the |Φij〉 are states of some ancillary system at her possession. After Bob applies Uη the resulting composite
state is given by
|ψ′1〉 = Uη |ψ′0〉 ⊗ |↓〉 = α↑↑
(√
p
p+η |↑↑↓〉+
√
η
p+η |↑↓↑〉
)
⊗ |Φ↑↑〉 (9)
+α↑↓ |↑↓↓〉 ⊗ |Φ↑↓〉+ α↓↑
(√
p
p+η |↓↑↓〉+
√
η
p+η |↓↓↑〉
)
⊗ |Φ↓↑〉+ α↓↓ |↓↓↓〉 ⊗ |Φ↓↓〉 .
The probability that Bob does not find find the second and third qubits in the state |↑2↓3〉 is
P¯↑↓ = 1− P↑↓ = 1− |α↑↑|
2 p+ |α↓↑|2 p
p+ η
, (10)
and the resulting composite state then is
|ψ′2〉 = N
(
α↑↑
√
η
p+η |↑↓↑〉 ⊗ |Φ↑↑〉+ α↑↓ |↑↓↓〉 ⊗ |Φ↑↓〉
+α↓↑
√
η
p+η |↓↓↑〉 ⊗ |Φ↓↑〉+ α↓↓ |↓↓↓〉 ⊗ |Φ↓↓〉
)
, (11)
where N , the normalization, is
1
N 2 = 1−
p
p+ η
(
|α↑↑|2 + |α↓↑|2
)
. (12)
4The probability that Alice passes the test is therefore given by
Ptest = ‖〈ξ | ψ′2〉‖2 = N 2
∥∥∥∥∥α↑↓
√
1− p− η
1− p |Φ↑↓〉+ α↓↑
√
η2
(1− p) (p+ η) |Φ↓↑〉
∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (13)
The maximum obtains for |Φ↑↓〉 = |Φ↓↑〉. This choice of the ancillary states does not affect the maximum of P¯↑↓.
Hence, Alice obtains no advantage by using ancillary systems and we can do away with them. Alice’s maximum
cheating probability is then
P ∗A = maxαij
P¯↑↓ · Ptest , (14)
where now
P¯↑↓ · Ptest =
∣∣∣∣∣α↑↓
√
1− p− η
1− p + α↓↑
√
η2
(1− p) (p+ η)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(15)
(P¯↑↓ = 1/N 2). Clearly, this expression is maximum when α↑↑ = α↓↓ = 0. Therefore, to maximize her chance of
successfully cheating Alice will prepare a state of the form
|ψ′0〉 =
√
1− δ |↑1↓2〉+
√
δ |↓1↑2〉 , (16)
where with no loss of generality we have set α↑↓ =
√
1− δ and α↓↑ =
√
δ. So that
P ∗A = max
δ
(√
(1− p− η) (1− δ)
1− p +
√
η2δ
(1− p) (p+ η)
)2
. (17)
Bob’s maximal bias
Bob wins and passes the test whenever Alice does not find the first qubit in the state |↑〉. The probability for
this is just p+ η. This gives an upper bound on Bob’s maximal cheating probability, which is reached if Bob always
announces that he has won. That is,
P ∗B = p+ η . (18)
Biases in the balanced case
In the balanced case a protocol is fair if P ∗A = P
∗
B. We can play with η to make P
∗
A and P
∗
B minimal under this
constraint. It is easy to show that the minimum then obtains for η =
(√
2− 1) /2. It follows that ǫA = ǫB =(√
2− 1) /2 and P ∗A = P ∗B = 1/√2.
IV. A SIX-ROUND THREE-SIDED DICE ROLLING PROTOCOL WITH A BIAS OF 0.181
Apart from the inherent limitations on the security of a multi-party quantum cryptographic protocol, it is most
interesting, both from a theoretical and a practical viewpoint, to determine what degree of security is afforded using
the least amount of communication. In this section we introduce a six-round three-sided dice rolling protocol following
the general construction presented in the second section. The protocol consists of two three-round stages. In the
first stage, we have Alice and Bob flip a balanced quantum coin. Following this, in the second stage, the winner and
Claire flip an imbalanced quantum coin, such that if both parties are honest Claire’s winning probability equals 1/3.
The protocol is considered fair if P¯ ∗A = P¯
∗
B = P¯
∗
C . Due to the protocols’ symmetry with respect to the interchange of
Alice and Bob there are only two nonequivalent worst case scenarios, i.e. either only Alice is honest or only Claire is
honest.
5Using the protocol in the previous section an honest Alice has a maximum chance of 1 − 1/√2 of progressing to
the second stage. Therefore, Alice’s maximum losing probability is given by
P¯ ∗A =
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
Π¯∗2/3 , (19)
while an honest Claire’s maximum losing probability is given by
P¯ ∗C = Π¯
∗
1/3 , (20)
with Π¯∗1/3 (Π¯
∗
2/3) the maximum losing probability of the party with a winning probability of 1/3 (2/3) when both
parties are honest. Hence, we require that
Π¯∗1/3 =
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
Π¯∗2/3 . (21)
If we use the WCF protocol of the previous section to implement the second stage, then Π¯∗1/3 and Π¯
∗
2/3, and hence the
P¯ ∗i , will depend on η. We then have to minimize the P¯
∗
i with respect to η under the constraint that they are all equal, or
what is the same thing, minimize Π¯∗1/3 under the constraint eq. (20). However, there are two possible implementations.
Either 1− p = 2/3 and the second stage begins with Alice preparing the state √2/3− η |↑1↓2〉+√1/3 + η |↓1↑2〉, or
else 1 − p = 1/3 and the second stage begins with Claire preparing the state √1/3− η |↑1↓2〉 +√2/3 + η |↓1↑2〉. In
the first case we have to compute
min
η
max
δ
1
2
(√
(2− 3η) (1− δ) +
√
9η2δ
(1 + 3η)
)2
(22)
under the constraint that
max
δ
1
2
(√
(2− 3η) (1− δ) +
√
9η2δ
(1 + 3η)
)2
=
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)(
1
3
+ η
)
, (23)
while in the second case we have to compute
min
η
(
2
3
+ η
)
(24)
under the constraint that(
2
3
+ η
)
=
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
max
δ
(√
(1− 3η) (1− δ) +
√
9η2δ
(2 + 3η)
)
. (25)
The first of these yields the lower bias ǫ¯A = ǫ¯B = ǫ¯C ≃ 0.181 corresponding to P¯ ∗A = P¯ ∗B = P¯ ∗C ≃ 0.848. The second
yields a bias of 0.199.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We have defined and studied a novel mutli-party generalization of weak coin flipping, which we have termed dice
rolling. In N -sided dice rolling N remote distrustful parties must decide on a number between 1 and N , with party i
having the preference for outcome i. We have shown that for any bias ǫ¯ ≪ 1 there exists a quantum protocol such
that an honest party is always guaranteed a 1/N − ǫ¯ chance of winning. This is in contrast with classical protocols
where for n ≤ ⌈N/2⌉ honest parties, the dishonest parties can force any outcome they desire. We have also presented
a six-round three-sided dice rolling protocol in which the honest party’s maximum losing probability equals 0.848 as
compared to the 2/3 that obtains when all parties are honest. Finally, this problem also admits a ”strong” variant
in which M ≥ 2 remote distrustful parties must agree on a number between 1 and N > 2, without any party being
aware of any other’s preference. Kitaev’s bound generalizes to these cases. In partciular, for M = 2 it can be
saturated, as will be shown in an upcoming publication [18].
We thank Lev Vaidman and Oded Regev for useful comments. N. Aharon acknowledges the support of the
Wolfson Foundation. J. Silman acknowledges the support of the the Israeli Science Foundation.
6APPENDIX A
For any dice rolling protocol, based on weak imbalanced coin flipping according to the scheme presented in section
II, party n’s maximum chance of losing is given by
P¯ ∗n =
N−1
N + ǫ¯n = Π¯
∗
n−1 +
∑N−1
k=n Π¯
∗
k
∏k−n
j=0
(
1− Π¯∗n−1+j
)
(A1)
= n−1n + δ¯n−1 +
∑N−1
k=n
(
1
k + δ¯k
) (
1
n − δ¯n−1
)∏k−n−1
j=1
(
n+j
n+j+1 − δ¯n−1+j
)
,
where Π¯∗k is party n’s maximum chance of losing stage k conditional on having made it to that round and δ¯k the
corresponding bias. If we now let δ¯
(n)
max=ˆmaxk δ¯k and δ¯
(n)
min=ˆmink δ¯k (k = n− 1, . . . , N − 1), then
ǫ¯n ≤ δ¯(n)max + δ¯(n)+
∑N−1
k=n
(
1
n − δ¯(n)min
)∏k−n−1
j=1
(
n+j
n+j+1 − δ¯(n)min
)
−δ¯(n)min
∑N−1
k=n
(
1
k + δ¯
(n)
max
)∏k−n−1
j=1
(
n+j
n+j+1 − δ¯(n)min
)
−δ¯(n)min
∑N−1
k=n
(
1
k + δ¯
(n)
max
)(
1
n − δ¯(n)min
)∑k−n−1
m=1
∏
j 6=m
(
n+j
n+j+1 − δ¯(n)min
)
< δ¯
(n)
max + δ¯
(n)
max
∑N−1
k=n
1
n
∏k−n−1
j=1
n+j
n+j+1
< Nδ¯
(n)
max (A2)
Hence, if each of the weak imbalanced coin flipping protocols, used to implement the dice rolling protocol, are such
that δ¯
(n)
max ≪ 1/N for any n, an honest party’s winning probability tends to 1/N .
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